

Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

21 March 1983

Executive Director

Executive Registry
83-1576

NOTE FOR: Fred Demech  
Deputy Executive Director, PFIAB

FROM: Executive Assistant/Executive  
Director

Here is the Bob Gates article  
you requested.



Enclosure



SECRET

*"Intelligence is like money and love:  
there is never enough."*

— A Senior White House Official

## AN OPPORTUNITY UNFULFILLED

### The Use and Perceptions of Intelligence Analysis at the White House

Robert M. Gates

#### OUR GOAL

*"Collection, processing and analysis all are directed at one goal—producing accurate reliable intelligence. . . . Who are the customers who get this finished product? At the very top, of the list is the President. He is, of course, the Central Intelligence Agency's most important customer."*

—Intelligence: The Acme of Skill  
(CIA Information Pamphlet)

And what have our most important customers and their principal assistants had to say about how well we achieve that goal?

*"I am not satisfied with the quality of our political intelligence."*

— Jimmy Carter, 1978

*"What the hell do those clowns do out there in Langley?"*

— Richard Nixon, 1970

*"In the 1960s and early 1970s, for eleven years in a row, the Central Intelligence Agency underestimated the number of missiles the Russians would deploy; at the same time the CIA also underestimated the totality of the Soviet program effort and its ambitious goals. . . . Thanks in part to this intelligence blunder we will find ourselves looking down the nuclear barrel in the mid-1980s."*

— Richard Nixon, 1980

*"CIA Director McCone . . . made recommendations for checking and improving the quality of intelligence reporting. I promptly accepted the suggestions. . . ."*

— Lyndon Johnson, Memoirs

*"During the rush of . . . events in the final days of 1958, the Central Intelligence Agency suggested for the first time that a Castro victory might not be in the interests of the United States."*

— Dwight Eisenhower, Memoirs

*"The Agency usually erred on the side of the interpretation fashionable in the Washington Establishment. . . . The analytical side of the CIA . . . generally reflected the most liberal school of thought in the government. . . . When warnings*

SECRET

17